預測臺灣大選結果是盤大生意

亞洲時報
撰文 Jonathan Adams
2008.03.14

臺北—當預測市場2000年在臺灣首度出現時,公眾的反應並不樂觀。雖然猜中了當年總統選舉結果,人們卻認為它沒有實際用途。

身為美國知名在線預測市場“艾奧瓦電子市場”的創建者之一,尼爾森(Forrest Nelson)說:“當時參與交易的,只有三四個人。他們對各個黨派有著明顯的政治偏好。預測市場沒有出現水土不服,讓我們感到非常驚訝。”

8年前冒出來的預測市場,曾一度被視為美國人頭腦發熱的搞怪行為;如今,它在全球越來越受歡迎,並已成為主流。歐洲足球比賽的結果是多少?艾奧瓦州今年會不會出現流感肆虐?巴基斯坦總統穆沙拉夫在本月下臺的機率有多大?這中間都有預測市場的影子。他們依仗的,自然不是魔法師所用的水晶球,而是各種高科技手段。

從臺灣未來事件交易所(nccu.swarchy.org)備受推崇的現象中,我們便可窺探出預測市場在全球的魅力。與之前的孤軍奮戰相比, 2,000多名來自臺灣、大陸、香港等地的政治愛好者已湧入這一網絡平臺,紛紛對臺灣3月22日的總統選舉進行下單交易。能否準確猜中選情,將是預測市場面臨的重大挑戰之一。

事實上,這場總統選舉還引出了兩大熱點話題:虛擬貨幣市場的表現能否與真實市場相媲美?交易者的偏好如何影響預測市場呢?

成立於2006年的臺灣預測市場研究中心,不過是茁壯成長中的新生亞洲預測市場的一個縮影。日本2005年便建立了首個政治預測市場;Shuugi.in 據說已有五百名民眾來買賣交易,預測今年底的眾議院選舉。臺灣2003年建立的政治期貨交易中心規模雖小,卻也成功預測了2004年的總統選舉結果。

像其他預測市場一樣,“未來事件交易所”採用了期貨概念,把集體情緒變為一個市場價格。除了可預測三月之後的玉米價格,參與者還可預測某一具體事件的結果(如某候選人的獲勝情況)。交易者以10萬虛擬點數入場,並用此來買賣合約。他們預測得越准,所得點數自然也就越多。

專家指出,美國的預測市場往往比民意調查更能反映真實情況。至於其中原因,沒有人能給出準確解釋。有人說,這類市場的參與者只考慮“誰會贏”,而不是“誰該贏”。還有人說,是受到了金錢蠱惑。由於交易者要為自己的選擇下注,因而會務求作出更準確的預測。

象大多數的美國預測市場一樣,臺灣禁止現金賭博。這會不會讓預測市場處於劣勢呢?

不一定。專家認為,對於虛擬貨幣市場與真實市場孰優孰劣,目前仍是個未知數。在將二者對美國國家橄欖球聯盟的賽季預測進行比較後,一份2004年的研究發現,它們的預測能力並無顯著差別,但準確性均遠勝過大多數的個人預測。

“兩個市場的參與者有著驚人的相似之處,因為若表現優異,虛擬貨幣市場參與者同樣也會獲得了心理上的滿足,”上述研究的作者之一、賓夕法尼亞大學沃頓商學院教授沃爾弗斯(Justin Wolfers)說。這似乎證明,在閒談中吹噓自己的預測能力強,也能給人帶來如同賺得大錢一樣的虛榮感。

對臺灣的預測市場,人們還有另一種質疑。不少交易者來自大陸和香港,可能對主張台獨的民進黨帶有抵觸情緒。難道這不會令預測結果偏向親北京的國民黨嗎?

不會!專家說,帶有相反偏好的交易者會在市場中相互抵消;在2000年臺灣選舉中,預測市場已證實了這一點。交易者參與其中,完全是為了勝出,而非證明某一觀點或表達對某一黨派的支持。只要市場能正常運作,參與者都會蜂擁而至,絲毫不理會它是否受到人為操縱或存在偏愛傾向他們。

美國喬治梅森大學的預測市場專家漢森(Robin Hanson)指出:“當交易者懷疑有人為操縱時,他們往往會選擇支持另一方。最終結果就是,當有人試圖操縱市場時,反而會增加了市場價格的準確性。”

當然,沒人會說預測市場向來百發百中,他們也不會這樣做。預測市場通常比任何個別專家、民意調查準確得多,已經是它非凡魅力的最好佐證。

精確過臺灣的民意調查,並非一樁難事。在2006年的倒扁浪潮中,多家媒體調查就再次低估了民進黨的民眾支持率;預測市場,則在估算所贏選票比例上較為精確。預測市場研究中心與政治期貨交易中心當時認為高雄市長選舉“有問題”,儘管兩大候選人的選票非常接近。臺灣預測市場研究中心主任林繼文(Lin Jih-wen)說:“我們不會錯過任何數據,也不沒有取樣偏見。這是我們力量的源泉。”

目前,預測市場普遍看好親大陸的國民黨候選人馬英九。這一預測是否準確,很快就要開蠱了。。但即使猜錯了,亞洲對預測市場這一新式算命工具的熱情也不會受到任何衝擊。

譯者 章彊

Big test for Taiwan prediction market

Asia Times Online
By Jonathan Adams
March 14, 2008

TAIPEI – When the first 『prediction market』 for a Taiwan election was set up in 2000, the result was disappointing.

The market correctly called the election result, but by other measures it was a dud.

『There were only three or four guys who were really doing the trading, and they had really strong biases – one guy favored one party, one was in favor of the other,』 said Forrest Nelson, a co-founder of the Iowa Electronics Markets, which helped run the Taiwan market. 『The fact that it worked at all was a major surprise.』

Eight years on, such markets have boomed in popularity. Once the preserve of a few oddball US enthusiasts, they’ve gone mainstream – and global. They’re now used as high-tech crystal balls to help predict everything from soccer scores in Europe to the severity of the flu season in Iowa to the likelihood of Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf stepping down.

Such markets’ growing global appeal is evident in Taiwan, which boasts a new, online Chinese-language prediction market. In contrast to the lonely market Nelson observed, some 2,000 politics fans from Taiwan, mainland China, Hong Kong and elsewhere have already crowded into the new market to trade contracts on who will win the closely watched March 22 presidential vote in Taiwan.

Whether it guesses correctly will be one of the market’s first big trials. The election will also test two still-debated points: Do 『funny money』 markets such as Taiwan’s perform as well as ones using real money, and how susceptible are such markets to trader bias?

Taiwan’s Center for Prediction Markets, set up in mid-2006, is one of a small but growing crop of Asia-based markets. In Japan, the first political prediction market was set up in 2005; the market Shuugi.in now has some 500 registered traders predicting the coming Lower House election. Taiwan also boasts the smaller Taiwan Political Exchange, which correctly called the island’s hotly contested 2004 presidential vote.

Like those other prediction markets, The Center for Prediction Markets’ works on the model of a futures market, aggregating collective sentiment into one market 『price』. Except instead of guessing, say, the price of corn three months from now, participants guess the likelihood of a specific outcome (such as a certain candidate winning). Traders start with 100,000 virtual points, which they use to buy and sell contracts. The better their predictions, the more points they rack up.

In the US, such markets have often outperformed public polls, experts say. But they’re still struggling to explain exactly why.

One reason is that such markets ask people who they think will win rather than who should win. Another often-cited point is financial incentive. Traders have to put their money where their mouth is, which gives them a stake in making good predictions.

But Taiwan’s new market, like most in the US, can’t use real money because of anti-gambling laws. That should put it at a disadvantage, right?

Not necessarily. Experts say the jury is still out on whether real money prediction markets outperform 『funny money』 ones. A 2004 study comparing real and virtual money markets for the US National Football League season found little difference in their predictive powers (both markets’ predictions were better than the vast majority of individual predictions).

『People in play money markets act surprisingly similar to people in real money markets because they get some kind of psychic reward for doing well,』 said Justin Wolfers, a professor at the Wharton School and one of the study’s co-authors. Turns out bragging rights can be as strong a motivator as cold cash.

Skeptics have another criticism of Taiwan’s market. Its traders include many from mainland China and Hong Kong, who are likely to have a strong bias against Taiwan’s pro-independence party. Won’t that skew the results in favor of its rival, the China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT)?

Nope again. Traders with extreme and opposing biases can be expected to cancel each other out, experts say, as happened in the 2000 Taiwan prediction market. And traders who are in the game to win (instead of to prove a point or back a party) will rush in to any market thought to be out of whack, whether by manipulation or home-team bias.

『When traders suspect that such manipulation might exist, they will bet on the other side,』 said Robin Hanson, an expert on prediction markets at George Mason University. 『The net effect is that the existence of people who might want to manipulate [the market] usually increases the accuracy of market prices.』

Still, no one claims prediction markets get it right every time – they don’t. The point, according to what academics call a persuasive body of evidence, is that such markets generally do a better job than predictions by any individual experts or forecasts from public polls.

Outperforming Taiwan’s polls shouldn’t be hard. They’re notoriously bad as a forecast of election outcomes. In late 2006, for example, many media polls underrated the pro-independence party’s support – a recurring problem. Taiwan’s prediction markets did a much better job of estimating vote shares (the island’s two markets both called the Kaohsiung mayoral election wrong, but that contest was a statistical dead heat).

『Most opinion polls usually have 20 to 30% ‘no answer’,』 said Lin Jih-wen, director of the Center for Prediction Markets. 『We don’t have missing data or a sampling bias, that’s our strength.』

The market has now picked the strong likelihood of victory by the China-friendly candidate Ma Ying-jeou. Time will tell if it’s got the right guy.

But even if it doesn’t, the markets’ enthusiastic reception shows how Asia – like the US and Europe – has embraced such markets as a powerful fortune-telling tool.